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ABSTRACT 
The emergence of smartwatches poses new challenges to 
information security. Although there are mature touch-based 
authentication methods for smartphones, the effectiveness of 
using these methods on smartwatches is still unclear. We 
conducted a user study (n=16) to evaluate how authentication 
methods (PIN and Pattern), UIs (Square and Circular), and 
display sizes (38mm and 42mm) affect authentication 
accuracy, speed, and security. Circular UIs are tailored to 
smartwatches with fewer UI elements. Results show that 1) 
PIN is more accurate and secure than Pattern; 2) Pattern is 
much faster than PIN; 3) Square UIs are more secure but less 
accurate than Circular UIs; 4) display size does not affect 
accuracy or speed, but security; 5) Square PIN is the most 
secure method of all. The study also reveals a security 
concern that participants’ favorite method is not the best in 
any of the measures. We finally discuss implications for 
future touch-based smartwatch authentication design. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Smartwatches are increasingly popular but also face unique 
challenges [10]. Although new methods are proposed to 
increase their I/O capability, their security is less addressed 
with most authentication methods being the same as those 
for smartphones (e.g., [3, 5, 11, 14]). Recent studies further 
raised the security concern for smartwatches (e.g., [12, 15]).  
Compared with smartphones, ultra-small screen wearable 
devices have even smaller sized screens, various shapes, and 
are carried around in a different way from smart phones. 
These might lead to different performance and preference of 
using commonly used touch-based authentication methods 
on smartwatches.  
In this paper, we focus on touch-based authentication 
methods, as they are already familiar to mobile phone users, 
and do not require extra sensing devices (e.g., high-quality 
camera for face recognition; bio-sensor for fingerprinting). 
We study how authentication methods (PIN and Pattern), 
user interfaces (Square and Circular) from the state-of-the-
art, and display sizes (38mm & 42mm) (see Figure 1) affect 
the authentication accuracy, speed and security. A PIN 
method requires a 4-digit PIN password and a Pattern 
method requires a drawn pattern connecting dots on the 
interface. We use “pattern with trace” in this research, which 
is the most common pattern method on smartphones. For 
Square interfaces, a common 10-dot grid is used for PIN and 
a 9-dot grid is used for Pattern. Circular interfaces are based 
on a 6-dot circle, which are inspired by recently emerged 
smartphone authentication methods (e.g., [11, 14]). Circular 
UIs may be a better fit for smaller sized smartwatches. We 
control all buttons to be the same size in all designs. In 
Circular layouts, we ensure all buttons are horizontally and 
vertically symmetric and evenly distributed. 
Our study results contribute to the understanding of how 
touch-based authentication methods, UIs and display sizes 
affect the authentication accuracy, speed, security on 
smartwatches, and users’ subjective preferences. 
      
(a) Square PIN            (b) Square Pattern 
     
(c) Circular PIN          (d) Circular Pattern 
Figure 1. Smartwatch touch-based authentication methods 
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EXPERIMENT 
We designed a 2*2*2 within-subject study to investigate the 
effects of three independent variables (IV) on three 
dependent variables. The three IVs are: the authentication 
method with two levels (Pattern and PIN); the UI with two 
levels (circular and square); the display size with two levels 
(42mm and 38mm), which are popular smartwatch sizes. 
Table 1 shows all the eight testing conditions. The three 
dependent variables are input speed, input accuracy, and 
security. To measure security, we conducted a shoulder 
surfing test, which is one of the most cited dangers for 
smartphone authentication systems [5]. We also measured 
users’ subjective preferences via post-test questionnaires. 
To simulate the smartwatch, we built an iOS application,  
which renders a  smartwatch interface at the center of an 
iPhone 5S (see Figure 2(a)) with 2 different diameter sizes: 
38mm (340*272 pixels) and 42mm (390*312 pixels). We 
stuck a wristband to the back of the smartphone so that 
participants could adjust it to wear the device firmly on their 
wrists (see Figure 2(b)). The weight of the simulator (112g) 
is comparative to many commercial smartwatches (e.g., 
Apple Watches:56g-125g). Similar to [6][7], we chose this 
approach to standardize the computing resource to eliminate 
any bias caused by the hardware and operating system. 
Tasks and Procedures 
We recruited 16 volunteers (7 females), who were graduate 
students and professionals aged between 21 and 42 (M=24, 
SD=7) and all right-handed. Twelve used PIN and four used 
Pattern as passwords for their personal smartphones; the 
length of passwords that they used for their smartphones 
ranged from 4 to 7 (8 participants used 4-digit passwords; 6 
used 6-digit ones; 2 used 5-digit ones; 2 used 7-digit ones). 
Only three of them used smartwatches before.  
We conducted the experiment in a quiet office with each 
participant seated at a desk. To avoid the effect of fatigue, 
we limited the length of the experiment to be about 45 
minutes in total. This dictates us to set the number of trials to 
be 15 for each of the 8 combinations (2 authentication 
methods * 2 UIs * 2 display sizes). We counterbalanced the 
authentication methods administered to participants using 8 
* 8 Latin Square.  
Each participant started with a training session and was 
asked to play around with all authentication methods until 
they felt comfortable.  In the formal study, for each of the 8 
authentication combinations, we asked participants to input 
15 preset passwords/patterns, which were sequentially 
displayed on the simulated smartwatch. PIN passwords were 
randomly generated at the length of 4, the default length on 
both iOS and Android. Patterns were randomly generated at 
the length from 3 to 6 (the number of dots in a pattern) based 
on [2]. We did not ask participants to remember passwords, 
as it is infeasible to remember 15 * 8 combinations. To 
ensure that results of all trials are independent of each other 
and thus eliminate the effect of human corrections, our 
experimental software did not provide the performance 
feedback to participants immediately. However, an overall 
performance summary was shown to participants at the end. 
After that, we conducted the shoulder-surfing test. We pre-
recorded a video of a person entering 5 password sets using 
each of the 2*2*2 authentication methods (see Table 1). To 
record each video, we placed the camera 20 cm over the 
person’s left shoulder for about half of the time and the 
person’s right shoulder for the rest of the time from the same 
angle. During the test, we asked each participant to watch all 
pre-recorded videos on a 13’ MacBook Pro and draw/write 
down the passwords/patterns that she/he saw in the videos 
(see Figure 2(c)). In the end, we asked participants to fill in 
a questionnaire to select the best authentication method in 
terms of efficiency, security, and overall preference. 
Measures and Data Collection 
The authentication accuracy was measured by the average 
accuracy rate of the input passwords/patterns. The 
authentication speed was measured by the average 
completion time of the inputs. To guarantee the number of 
input is the same for every subject on each condition, both 
successful and unsuccessful inputs were considered. For 
each input, the time counter started when the user’s finger 
touched on the screen and ended when the finger last lifted. 
Security was estimated by the rate of correctly replicated 
passwords/patterns in the shoulder surfing experiment.  
For the accuracy and speed, the correctness of an 
authentication trial and time taken were recorded by the 
application. For security (the easiness of unauthorized 
replications), participants were asked to draw/write down the 
authentication patterns/pins observed from the pre-recorded 
simulated shoulder surfing videos. The number of correct 
replications was calculated by matching the attempts of 
participants and the actual patterns or pins. 
         
(a)   (b)          (c) 
Figure 2. (a) the simulated smartwatch. (b) a side view of the 
simulated smartwatch. (c) the shoulder surfing test. 
Size Authentication Scheme 
38mm 
Circular PIN 
Square PIN 
Circular Pattern 
Square Pattern 
42mm 
Circular PIN 
Square PIN 
Circular Pattern 
Square Pattern 
Table 1. Eight authentication methods studied in this paper. 
RESULTS 
The average authentication accuracy, speed and security are 
shown in Figure 3, Figure 4 and Figure 5 respectively.  
We ran three-way repeated measure ANOVA on the 
accuracy, speed and security data respectively, and used the 
partial eta-squared (ߟ௣ଶ) as a measure of the effect size. The 
results are shown in Table 2.  
Subjective Feedback: We asked participants to select the 
best methods based on their perceived authentication speed, 
security, and overall preference. Most participants (77%) 
considered Pattern methods to be faster than PIN methods, 
with Square Pattern (39%) winning slightly more votes than 
Circular Pattern (38%). Square UI was considered more 
secure than Circular UI, whereas there was no bias between 
Square Pattern and Square PIN, both of which received 43% 
votes. Participants intuitively thought that more dots (Square 
UIs) could lead to better security. For the overall preference, 
Pattern methods were preferred by most participants 
compared to PIN methods. Specifically, Square Pattern was 
the most favorite method with 50% of participants’ votes. 
36% liked Circular Pattern most and the two PIN methods 
only got 7% votes each. 
DISCUSSION  
Accuracy: PIN methods are significantly more accurate than 
Pattern methods. This might be due to two factors:1) Pattern 
methods require longer finger motion paths on the screen, 
which increases the chance of failure; 2) the fat finger effect 
has a larger effect on Pattern methods. Twelve out of the 
sixteen participants (75%) complained that they had to move 
their fingers continuously on the small screen while drawing 
patterns, which increased the chance of visual occlusion. 
Results also show that Circular UI outperforms Square UI. 
This could be caused by the fewer buttons on the Circular UI 
than Square one (6 vs. 9). 
Authentication Speed: Pattern methods have a significant 
advantage over PIN methods in speed. One possible reason 
is Pattern methods do not require repetitive touch and swipe 
actions on the screen. It is interesting to note that differences 
in UI or the display size do not significantly affect speed. 
Security: All three independent variables and two 
interaction terms have a significant effect on security. 
Results reveal that PIN methods are more secure than 
Pattern methods (attack success rates: PIN (M:.42, SD:.26), 
Pattern (M:.87, SD:.18)). One explanation is that the trace of 
finger’s motion is on the screen until the finger is lifted, 
which has less visual occlusion than repetitive touches in 
PIN methods and thus makes it easier for shoulder surfers to 
spy on. Another possible reason is memorizing a pattern is 
easier than remembering a password combination for most 
Table 2. Repeated measure ANOVA results on the effect of method, UI and size on the authentication accuracy, speed and security. 
 Accuracy Speed Security 
Method (PIN, Pattern) F1, 15=52.71, p < .05, ࣁ࢖૛ ൌ	. ૠૡ F1, 15 = 61.11, p < .05, ࣁ࢖૛ ൌ . ૡ૙ F1, 15 = 125.35, p < .05, ࣁ࢖૛ ൌ . ૡૢ 
UI (Square, Circular) F1, 15=9.15, p < .05 , ࣁ࢖૛ ൌ	. ૜ૡ F1, 15 = .09, ns F1, 15 = 25.59, p < .05, , ࣁ࢖૛ ൌ . ૟૜ 
Size (38 mm, 42mm) F1, 15=.35, ns F1, 15 = .35, ns F1, 15 = 4.67, p < .05, ࣁ࢖૛ ൌ . ૛૝ 
Method * UI F1, 15 = .66, ns F1, 15 = .21, ns F1, 15 = .5.40, p < .05, ࣁ࢖૛ ൌ . ૛ૠ 
Method * Size F1, 15 = .06, ns F1, 15 = 4.39, ns F1, 15 = 5.98, p < .05, ࣁ࢖૛ ൌ . ૛ૢ 
UIs * Size F1, 15 = 2.90, ns F1, 15 = .11, ns F1, 15 = 2.48, ns 
Method * UIs * Size F1, 15 = .477, ns F1, 15 = .08, ns F1, 15 = 1.32, ns 
 
Figure 3. Accuracies for all testing conditions  
 
Figure 4. Time spent for all testing conditions 
 
 
Figure 5. Shoulder surfing attack success rates of all conditions 
people [1, 4, 13]. Moreover, Square UI is more secure than 
circular UI (attack success rates: Square (M:.57, SD:.34, 
Circular (M:.72, SD:.28)). This is possibly due to more 
buttons on the Square UIs. Additionally, Square PIN is the 
most secure method of all.  
Questionnaire: Results indicate most of the participants 
think Pattern methods require less authentication time, 
which is in line with our analysis. Participants thought 
Square methods are more secure than Circular methods, 
which is also consistent with our results. In terms of 
subjective preference, the most favorite method is Square 
Pattern. One possible reason is that people are more familiar 
with it since it is one of the dominant authentication methods 
on smartphones [3]. However, this raises a security concern 
because Square Pattern is not the best in any measures.  
The Size of Smartwatches: Results show that the size of 
smartwatch (18.14% difference in the touching area) does 
not have significant effect on the authentication accuracy and 
speed. It contradicts with the intuition that larger watch face 
might lead to the increase in accuracy because of the slightly 
more space for fingers to touch, the decrease in the 
authentication speed because of the longer distance for 
fingers to travel. Additionally, the larger watch size did not 
lead to the decrease in the security (attack success rates 
:42mm (M:.62, SD:.33), 38mm (M:.68, SD:.30)). However, 
whether this will hold true for larger differences in the sizes 
of smartwatches needs further examination. 
Limitations: We conducted the study on a simulated 
smartwatch. Although this design keeps external factors 
(e.g., hardware, OS) constant, it might still deviate from a 
real smartwatch due to the differences in weight and 
convenience. Second, in shoulder surfing tests, we only 
considered a replication as a success if the fully correct 
password was given. However, hackers may get a partially 
correct password and use it to increase the possibility of 
brute-force attack. Thus, the degree of similarity between the 
entered password and the correct one may be considered. In 
addition to the entered password, the way how people enter 
them can also be considered, which was shown as a 
promising enhancement to password patterns to decrease the 
risk of side-channel attack (e.g., [8, 9]). Third, our study 
evaluated pattern with trace since it is more popular than 
pattern without a trace. However, pattern without a trace 
may increase the difficult for shoulder surfing attack. Fourth, 
our study examined the common shapes for the circular and 
square UIs with the same sized buttons. However, the 
number of buttons in these UIs are different. UI designs with 
the same number of buttons for Square and Circular UIs 
correspondingly can be studied to better generalize the 
findings between Square and Circular UIs. Additionally, 
there are other uncommon shapes for organizing the buttons, 
such as hexagon, octagon, which may affect the touch-based 
authentication. 
Our work is an initial exploration of factors that may affect 
the performance of touch-based authentication methods on 
smartwatches. Besides the limitations mentioned above, 
many research questions remain open. For example, users’ 
prior experience of using PIN/Pattern methods, their physical 
state (e.g., sitting, standing and walking) can also play a role 
in users’ performance and preference of the authentication 
methods. 
CONCLUSION 
We empirically studied how two watch sizes (38mm and 
42mm), two UIs (Square and Circular) and two methods 
(PIN and Pattern) affected accuracy, speed, and security of 
the touch-based smartwatch authentication. Results show 
that:1) PIN are more accurate and secure than Pattern; 2) 
Pattern are much faster than PIN; 3) Square UIs are more 
secure but less accurate than Circular UIs, and UIs do not 
affect speed significantly; 4) the display size does not affect 
accuracy or speed, but security; 6) Square PIN is the most 
secure method of all; 7) users’ most preferred method is 
Square Pattern, which is not the best in any measure. As the 
first empirical validation work on touch-based authentication 
methods on smartwatches, our results provide insights for 
app developers in designing authentication methods by 
considering tradeoffs between accuracy, speed and security. 
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